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	Directorate of Intellige	nce
	8 June 1987	
	ombian Economy: Some Pro	
policy. Still in economic reform pro insurgencies, reord a reform of the de-	the discussion phase are: ograms, a plan to aid are ganization of the electrivelopment planning system ngress in December 1986.	urban and rural eas suffering from the cal power sector, and
review a bill that investment in the liquidelines for debined political confinancial sector has means of strength off government resulting reform of the suffered from a lainsider loans made	congress, which reconventains to ease the terms of banking system and containt-for-equity swaps in the users in support of for as emerged because many of the hening the financial system of the cources, as was done in the ailing domestic banking to the banks-has left to a decade, but more needs	of entry for foreign ons preliminary to banking sector. A reign investment in the colombians see this as tem without draining ne past. A five-year systemwhich has ten corruption, and the banking sector in
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Bank. It was prep Latin American Ana Issues. This anal	briefing was requested by ared by analysts of the Calysis and coordinated with the calysis is based on informations may be directed to the ALA	Office of African and th the Office of Global tion as of 4 June 1987.

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After nine months in office, Barco is still emphasizing his social and economic approach to counterinsurgency, but the	
President and the public are increasingly concerned about the security situation. Barco's two big problems are narcotics	
trafficking and insurgency. He remains committed to combating the export of illegal drugs.	25 X 1
The drug trade has a profound influence on the Colombian economy, manifest in the far-reaching power of major trafficking organizations. Illegal earnings from cocaine and marijuana smuggling have increased, and probably represent at least 4 percent of GDP. Drug earnings are Colombia's second most	
important source of income after coffeeequivalent to about 20	
percent of legal exports in 1985, according to US Embassy reporting.	25 X 1
reporting.	23/1
Less than 5 percent of these revenues return to	
Colombia the rest stays in the hands of intermediaries abroad,	
especially in the United States. The drug proceeds that are	
repatriated support a wide variety of legitimate businesses,	
however, including legal and economic consulting firms, currency	
exchange houses, and thousands of retail front businesses. Drug	
money generally enters Colombia in the form of US dollars, gold, and other goods, or is disguised through the fraudulent invoicin	
of imports and exports. Illicit imports financed by drug	g
moneymostly consumer goodsamount to about \$400 to \$500	
million per year.	25X1
Insurgent attacks on the economic infrastructure is the	
other main problem. Attacks on pipelines, electric power pylons	
and other economic targets have caused more than \$135 million in	
damage during the last 12 months. The Cano Limon oil pipeline,	
the main export outlet, has been the major target, but thus far	4
repairs have been made quickly enough to avoid serious oil expor losses. Guerrilla activity is also intensifying in the rich	τ
northwestern agricultural region of Uraba, which generated \$200	
million in banana exports last year, and in Western Antioquia,	•
where rebels recently blew up power installations, temporarily	
paralyzing gold mining operations for the second time in six	
months.	25 X 1
Colombian officials have showned their intentions	
Colombian officials have stressed their intention to counte insurgent attacks against economic targets. They have also	r
promised that the oil basin along the Ecuadorean border would be	
opened to foreign investors.	25X1
•	
If the economy performs as well as expected during the Barc	0
administration, drug traffickers may take advantage of high real	
domestic interest rates to return an increasing amount of cash t	0
Colombia. Even if Barco tries to reduce the influence of drug	

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money on Colombian society, the government is unlikely to inflict serious financial blows on major traffickers unless concerted international efforts are made to monitor and curb drug money flows.	25X1
Barco has requested congressional approval to increase Colombia's foreign debt obligations by \$5 billion during 1987-90 to carry out the economic reform program he believes is essential to solve the country's complex internal security problems. Bogota is seeking \$3 billion during 1987-90 to close its projected financial gap and avoid a debt rescheduling and would float bonds and other instruments in international financial markets to raise the remaining funds. For 1987, total foreign investment is projected at about \$500 million, but these flows are expected to decline.	25X1
Bogota wants to make coal a key foreign exchange earner in coming yearsannual export earnings could exceed \$1 billion by 1990, according to government projections. Excellent thermic quality, low sulphur and ash content, and good geographic	20/1
location make Colombian coal an attractive energy source. The long-term goal is to capture 10 percent of the world coal market (40-50 million tons) by the year 2000 with domestic consumption at 20 million tons. According to US Embassy reporting, Colombia could benefit from continuing political problems in South Africa by eventually replacing it as a supplier in some world markets in the Far East and Europe. Other Colombian coal customers include the United States, Japan, Israel, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Central	25X1
America, and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, there are some clouds on this horizon. Some economic experts consider the government coal export projections optimistic. Guerrillas and drug traffickers operating near some potential coal projects may hinder expanded coal production, and	∠ 5 X 1

labor union.

politically motivated union demands may end the honeymoon between

Cerrejon North coal company management and the communist-led

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SUBJECT: The Colombian Economy: Some Problem Areas

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